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As is well known, housing has a unique set of characteristics which
cause the operation of the housing market to be di¤erent from that of
other markets. Therefore it is not surprisingly that the study of housing
and residential mobility forms a recurrent theme in economic research.
In this paper a stock-‡ow housing market model is proposed where
households search for a dwelling in an equilibrium framework. De-
pending on housing market conditions as expressed by the arrival rate
of residential o¤ers, and the fastidiousness of households as expressed
by the reservation place utility, households move to another dwelling.
The model yields a theoretical relationship between vacancies, search
and residential mobility. For the emprical analysis we make use of the
Dutch Housing Demand Survey (WBO), which contains retrospective
data on housing market histories of participants.
1 Introduction
The study of housing choice and mobility forms a recurrent theme in eco-
nomic research. Nowadays, a vast amount of literature exists on both theo-
retical and empirical issues on housing. In an earlier contribution Clark and
¤Corresponding author. De Boelelaan 1105. 1081 HV Amsterdam. The Netherlands.
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Van Lierop (1986) give an interesting overview of the housing choice and mo-
bility literature. They distinguish two di¤erent streams of literature. On the
one hand they address the literature on housing choice, based on the utility
maximizing paradigm, and on the other hand they discuss the literature on
residential mobility, based on the notion of disequilibrium. More recently,
new developments in microeconomic theory, like imperfect information and
search theory, have come to fore. For example, Arnott (1989) and later Read
(1997) examined vacancies and rent dispersion in a partial search model of
the rental market. Moreover, Van der Vlist et al. (1998) have recently ex-
amined vacancies and residential mobility in an equilibrium search model,
where housing choice and mobility is the result of both wealth maximizing
behavior of the household, and pro…t maximizing behavior of the landlord.
However, up till now no structural empirical equilibrium search model of the
housing market exists. It is the purpose of the present paper to formulate
and estimate an equilibrium search model for the housing market.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we formulate our equilib-
rium search model of the housing market. Data, empirical speci…cation and
estimation issues are discussed in section 3. Results and implications will
be given in section 4, which is currently under construction. Conclusions
will be drawn out in section 5.
2 The Equilibrium Search Model
2.1 Search for a Dwelling by Households
The demand side of the model is the more or less standard search model for
homogeneous households where we assume that every household is continu-
ously searching for a better residence. Initially, households are supposed not
to have a dwelling of their own when entering the housing market. Over time
households may receive an o¤er, which is either accepted or rejected. We
assume that a dwelling is entirely characterized by its so-called place utility,
de…ned as the net composition experienced in a certain location (Wolpert,
1965) . Following standard practice 1, we assume that the search process of
the individuals’ maximizing expected wealth can be described as the random
arrival of o¤ers by means of a Poisson process, whereby o¤ers are assumed
to be identical and independent drawings from a known density function
f(r) with associated distribution function F(r), and complement F(r) and
r place utility. We assume that o¤ers arrive at a constant rate ¸ 2 [¸0; ¸1],
1See Lippman and McCall (1971)or Mortensen (1986) for a discussion of search theory.
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whereby ¸0 is the arrival rate of o¤ers for households not yet having a
dwelling of their own, and ¸1 for households already having a dwelling of
their own. Moreover, we assume that households receive at most one o¤er
per period, whereby no recall is allowed. Upon arrival the household has
to decide whether to accept or reject the o¤er depending on whether the
place utility o¤ered is greater or smaller than a certain value respectively.
By the stationarity assumption, this value is the same in all periods. If the
value exceeds a so-called reservation value, the household will transit to the
dwelling. During residence, the household is assumed to experience a con-
stant place utility. We assume households to break up following a Poisson
process at a constant rate µ 2. Moreover, we assume that households can
be forced to move due to renovation of the dwelling, whereby they leave the
dwelling and return to a situation of not having a dwelling of their own,
which happens following a Poisson process at a constant rate · . Finally, let
ro be the baseline utility level of households not having a dwelling of their
own, and ½ the discount rate. Thus, for a household to accept a dwelling,
the place utility o¤ered should be greater than a minimum value of place
utility. The optimal value of the reservation place utility can be obtained
by using the principle of dynamic programming, with reservation value r¤




½ + · + µ + ¸1F (r)
dr (1)
whereas for households having a dwelling of their own the optimal strategy
is to accept each o¤er strictly better than the present one.
Interpretation of the reservation equation reveals that if the o¤er arrival
rate for households not having a dwelling of their own is smaller than that
of households having a dwelling, then the reservation value r¤ will be lower
than ro. So in a housing market having great di¢culties for newly formed
households to obtain an o¤er, dwellings which yield a lower utility than the
baseline utility level ro will be accepted. The reason is that when newly
entered households are discriminated, such that ¸0 < ¸1 it is attractive for
the household to …rst accept a dwelling with a low place utility level and
subsequently move to one with a higher place utility, than wait for another
o¤er while not having a dwelling of their own. On the other hand, if o¤er
arrival rates for both states are the same, a household with no dwelling of
their own will set the reservation value equal to ro. If the housing market is
such that the arrival rate for households having a dwelling is smaller than
2As a …rst attempt to model …nite lifetime we assume lifetime to be exponential.
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that for households not having a dwelling of their own, then the reservation
value will be higher than ro.
Since we expect o¤ers to be di¤erent from the place utility actually ex-
perienced, we distinguish between the o¤er distribution F(r) and the distri-
bution of place utility experienced G(r). Moreover, we distinguish between
households who experience at most a place utility r, and those which ex-
perience more than r. Our stock-‡ow representation of the housing market
in Figure 1 shows that households may move to one of the three states





Dwellings with place utility at most r















Figure 1: A Stock-Flow Scheme of the Housing Market
Figure 1 shows that households not having a dwelling of their own may
move to a dwelling of either the housing stock with place utility at most r,
or to one of the stock with place utility at least depending on the housing
market and as long as they are alive. If dwellings with place utility of at
most r are o¤ered more frequently, households may move to dwellings with
this lower place utility more frequently. In addition, since households con-
tinuously search for better dwellings, households may subsequently move
to dwellings with place utility of at least r. As such the model captures
housing career where households start in a less preferred dwelling and sub-
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sequently move to a dwelling with higher place utility. As a result of the
residential move, a dwelling with lower place utility becomes vacant, which
subsequently will be o¤ered on the market, thus creating a vacancy chain.
As a result, residential mobility is higher if households start in dwellings
with place utility at most r, than when households start in dwellings with
place utility at least r. Moreover, as Figure 1 reveals, due to urban renewal
households might be forced to move. However, as can be seen, households
are assumed not to move from high to low- utility dwellings.
Concentrating on the number of households experiencing at most r, the
time rate change equals in‡ow minus out‡ow:




· + µ + ¸1F (r)
´
G(r)(m ¡ u) (2)
In a steady-state situation in‡ow must balance out‡ow, so that the steady-
state distribution of place utility equals
G(r) =
F (r)




Using the steady-state homelessness rate, the steady-state distribution of
place utility reduces to
G(r) =
(· + µ)F(r)
· + µ + ¸1F(r)
(4)
This equation is the structural relationship imposed by the steady-state
equilibrium between the distribution G of actual place utility experienced
and the distribution F of o¤ers. It reveals that the fraction of households
experiencing at most r goes to zero, as either ·+µ goes to zero, or ¸1 tends
to in…nity; that is, all households will experience the highest place utility
in the limit. To determine the equilibrium distribution G of actual place
utility, we …rst have to determine the equilibrium distribution F of o¤ers by
the supply side of the housing market, which is the topic of the next section.
2.2 Supply of Housing
On the supply side, homogeneous suppliers post a dwelling with an adver-
tised price p, which maximizes a pro…t function
¼ = (p ¡ c) l (p) (5)
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with l (p) the occupancy level, p the revenue, and c the operating costs of
housing provision. We may now relate the advertised price to the households
place utility r by
r = ® ¡ p (6)
with ® a place utility index depending on certain dwelling characteristics.
It is assumed that each supplier has one vacant dwelling. We assume
that at a certain time a certain number of dwellings is occupied, and a given
number of dwellings is vacant. The total number of dwellings is …xed in the
short run. We assume that there is no bargaining over the advertised price.
The number of occupied dwellings is then determined by the o¤ered place
utility, the reservation place utility level of the households, and the o¤ers
of other suppliers, as represented by F(r). Competition for a household
by suppliers to let them occupy the dwelling eliminates discontinuities in
the o¤er distribution. To see this, we notice that households continuously
search for better dwellings 3. As a result of continuous search, the supplier
knows that if he o¤ers a dwelling with a slightly higher price no one will
accept the o¤er. If on the other hand, he o¤ers the dwelling with a slightly
lower price, all want to have the dwelling, and the supplier can attract all
households, which implies a larger pro…t. As a result, each supplier chooses a
di¤erent price that will maximize his pro…ts. Given these o¤ers, the number
of households per supplier who occupy a dwelling with place utility less than
r can be de…ned as




m¸0(· + µ)(· + µ + ¸1)
(· + µ + ¸0)
³
· + µ + ¸1F(r)
´2 (7)
Having described demand and supply, we now turn to the housing market
equilibrium, which is the topic of the next section.
2.3 Equilibrium
Using the steady-state occupancy level for the supplier o¤ering the lowest
acceptable place utility level r 4, we can derive the equilibrium pro…t level.
In equilibrium, every o¤er must yield the same steady-state pro…t which
3 It is clear that if search and moving costs are introduced households will not necessarily
move to a dwelling with higher place utility, because the gain in place utility should exceed
a certain threshold level to overcome these costs (see also Van Ommeren, 1996).
4The lowest place utility level is assumed to correspond to the highest acceptable price.
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equals (® ¡ r ¡ c)m¸0(· + µ)=(· + µ + ¸0)(· + µ + ¸1). As a result, the
unique equilibrium o¤er distribution for r 2 [r¤; r] is
F ¤(r) =





® ¡ r ¡ c
® ¡ r ¡ c
!
(8)
Using the fact that the highest place utility o¤ered (r) satis…es F(r)=1, i.e.
1 =





® ¡ r ¡ c








· + µ + ¸1
¶2!
(® ¡ c) +
µ
· + µ
· + µ + ¸1
¶2
r
as well as the fact that households will not accept any o¤er with place utility
less than their reservation value, i.e.
r = r¤
we consequently obtain the equilibrium value for the reservation place utility
5
r¤ =
(· + µ + ¸1)2ro + (¸0 ¡ ¸1)¸1(® ¡ c)
(· + µ + ¸1)2 + (¸0 ¡ ¸1)¸1
(10)
The equilibrium value for the occupancy level, and the distribution of the
place utility experienced equals then:
l¤ (r; r¤; F (r)) =
m¸0(· + µ)
(· + µ + ¸0)(· + µ + ¸1)
® ¡ r¤ ¡ c












which completes the formulation of our model.
3 Data, Speci…cation and Estimation
3.1 Data
For the empirical analysis we make use of a Dutch Housing Demand Survey
(WBO)(cf. CBS, 1995a,b). In the WBO, a random sample of all o¢cially
5For simplicity, we assume ½ to be small relative to the o¤er arrival rate (see also
Mortensen en Neumann, 1988).
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registered individuals in the Netherlands of 18 year and older is asked to
participate in the survey. Reasons for asking individuals rather than using
households or dwellings as the sample unit are (i) to acquire information on
potential new households, and (ii) to acquire information on individuals oc-
cupying part of a dwelling, or who do not have a dwelling of their own. From
a total of 11,739.174 individuals of at least 18 years old, 84,326 are asked
in the 1993/94 WBO to participate, of which 74.5% actually participated.
From this we select only those observations for which the participant is the
principal occupant of the dwelling, which leaves us with 56,597 observations.
In this survey extensive information on housing and households is col-
lected. It contains information on aspects of the current occupied dwelling,
the former occupied dwelling, and of the household, like the number of
household-members, employment-status, commuting distance, dwelling type,
tenure, rent or mortgage, and income. In addition, subjective information
is collected with respect to satisfaction with the current dwelling, perceived
safety of the neigborhood, reasons of moving, and preferred location and
dwellingtype when moving.
Though the WBO does not follow individuals over time, we do have in-
formation about housing market histories, since households are asked about
recent moves, and the former occupied dwelling. In the WBO, individuals
were asked about the number of transitions over the last …ve years, the as-
sociated spell of occupation, and the associated dwelling characteristics. As
such, we have retrospective information on the housing-market history of
the household. Figure 2 shows di¤erent types of duration data contained in
the WBO.
For the …rst type of observations, 40,251 observations, we know the time
of entrance, and the elapsed duration but not the residual duration, which
is referred to as right-censored spells. For the second type of observations,
13,474 observations, we have both a left-censored spell of which we do not
know the elapsed duration but do know the residual duration, and a right-
censored spell of which we do know the elapsed duration but not the residual
duration. For the case of two transitions, 2,354 observations or three transi-
tions, 518 observations, we have a left-censored, one or two completed spells,
and a right-censored spell. Unfortunately, examination of the data reveals
that we only have su¢cient detailed information for the …rst and the sec-
ond type of observations. For the third and the fourth type of observations,
we do have information on the di¤erent spells, but however do not have















Figure 2: Duration Data
3.2 Empirical Speci…cation
In order to estimate our model and to obtain empirical equilibrium values
for (8), (10), (11) and (12) we parameterize the place utility index ®, the
baseline utility level r0, and the operating cost c, and measure the housing
price p. Our parameters of the model are ®, · ,¸0, ¸1, ½ and r0, and c.
Following Phipps and Carter (1984) we parameterize the place utility index
by separate and independent components of the residential environment.
These orthogonal components are attributes of the dwelling unit, the neigh-
borhood, the neigborhood people, and the dwelling’s accessibility6, and are
de…ned in the Appendix.
Assuming place utility to be additive in the attributes, we can specify
our place utility index ® as
® = x¯1 + " (13)
where the vector of the residential and neigborhood attributes x is orthog-
onal on ", and " is i.i.d. normal (0; ¾2). Our baseline utility level is found
by7
ro = min(®) (14)
6See also Clark and Van Lierop (1986) for a discussion of the literature on these
attributes.
7This has been done by Kiefer and Neumann (1993) to …nd the reservation value. In
9
In addition, operating expenses for the supplier consists of taxes, insurance
and costs for maintenance like repair and replacement costs. The operating
cost index c depends on the residential attributes8 x1, with x1 ½ x
c = x1¯2 + " (15)
Moreover, the renovation parameter · depends on both residential and
neigborhood attributes, so that
· = x¯3 + " (16)
In addition, values for the o¤er arrival rate ¸0 and ¸1 depend on current
residential and neigborhood attributes, such that
¸0 = x¯3 + " (17)
¸1 = x¯4 + " (18)
In our analysis, we impute di¤erent values9 for the discount rate ½, since
most empirical studies fail to estimate the time preference rate because of
numerical problems 10. Our estimation procedure is discussed in the next
section.
3.3 Estimation 11
Using Poisson processes as the stochastic process generating a sequence of
events, it can be shown12 that both the waiting time until the …rst event, and
the times between events in a Poisson (¸F (r¤)) process has an exponential
distribution with parameter ¸F (r¤): As is well known13, the probability
distribution F of duration t for the exponential distribution is
F (t) = 1 ¡ expf¡¸F (r¤)tg (19)
relation to this, Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) argue that, within certain bounds, the
way in which the baseline level is calculated does not substantially matter.
8See also De Leeuw and Ekanam (1971), Eubank and Sirmans (1979) and in particular
Rosen and Smith ( 1983).
9More appropriately, as observed by Tony Lancaster in a private consultation, we could
specify a distribution for ½
10See for estimation of the subjective rate of time preference in job search models,
Nadrendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990).
11For empirical issues in estimating equilibrium models we refer to Van den Berg and
Ridder (1993), and Kiefer and Neumann (1993).
12See Lancaster (1990) for a discussion of Poisson processes in duration analysis.
13See Kiefer (1988) for an outstanding introduction to duration data and hazard
functions.
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with survival function S(t)
S(t) ´ 1 ¡ F(t) = expf¡¸F (r¤)tg (20)









= ¸F (r¤) (22)
This relation between the hazard function and the duration in a particular
state will be used in the sequel, since we are interested in the distribution of
duration (t) for the di¤erent states, and how these distributions are related
to the density function of prices (p), and of place utility (r).
Recognizing that the process of movement by a household from state
to state is a three-state14 continuous-time Markov Chain15, with constant
transition probabilities only depending on the current state, the transition




¡(¸0F (r) + ¸0F (r)) ¸0F(r) ¸0F (r)






















The total individual likelihood function is made up of the individual
likelihoods for the case the individual does occupy a dwelling of their own,
and for the case the individual does not occupy a dwelling of their own at
the time of the interview. Let ( t, p) denote an observation, with t either
left censored (tr), complete (tc or simply t) or right-censored te, and p the
price.
[under construction]
14Actually, the model is a four-state model since we assume households to be dissolved
at rate µ, which is however irrelevant, since the data is retrospective.







This paper has formulated an empirical equilibrium search model for the
housing market. Starting from individual0s optimal behavior, expressions for
the equilibrium reservation place utility and the equilibrium o¤er distribu-
tion has been obtained. For the empirical analysis we have made use of the
Dutch Housing Demand Survey, which contains retrospective data on the








BJAAR year of construction 20
TUIN lot 2
GARCARP garage / carport 3
OPPHFDWV surface livingroom 7
KAMERS number of rooms Numeric
ISOL insulation 3
OWONING appropriateness of the dwelling 8
TWONING satisfaction with the current dwelling 6
Neigborhood
TWOONOMG satisfaction with the neigborhood 6
LANDGEB urban/rural area 2
BRTBWPER year of construction 5




BRTBUREN noise of neighbors 3
Accessibility
BRTCENTR distance from a center 3
BRTHALTE public transport available 3
HBWWRP commuting distance Numeric
Cost of Housing Provision
ONDERHD maintenaince cost Numeric
Price
HUUR rent Numeric
IHS rent assistance Numeric
ERFPACHT long lease Numeric
KOOP potential salesprice 30
HYPLAST mortgage Numeric
PREMIE93 ownership assistance Numeric





AANTVERH number of moves during (1989-1993) 2
VESTPRD1 date …rst move 9
VESTPRD2 date second move 9
VESTPRD3 date third move 9
VESTPRD4 date fourth move 9
VESTPER/ date to current place 14
VERSTPRD
VSORTWO1 dwellingtype disposed of
at the time of the …rst move 18
VSORTWO dwellingtype disposed of
at the time of the last move 18
VGROOTHH number of family-members
at the time of the last move Numeric
VREDHUSA reason for last move 3
VREDEN reason for chosing the current dwelling 31
VHUKO tenure last dwelling 3
VKOOP salesprice of lastest disposed of dwelling 30
VHUUR rent last dwelling Numeric
VIHS rent-assistance last dwelling Numeric
VTYPWON type of the last dwelling 5
VBJAAR construction year of the last dwelling 19
VKAMERS number of rooms last dwelling Numeric
VGROTER is current dwelling bigger than last one 3
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